INTRODUCTION
Trump–Xi Meeting in June: On March 10, 2025, The Wall Street Journal reported that high‐level envoys from the United States and China engaged in exploratory discussions to arrange a bilateral summit between President Donald J. Trump and President Xi Jinping in mid‐June (Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2025). At stake are deeply entrenched legal, constitutional, and policy tensions involving trade sanctions, national security prerogatives, and Congress’s oversight role. This developing episode raises core questions under the U.S. Constitution—specifically, the President’s power to negotiate foreign agreements in light of statutory constraints and Congressional authority over tariffs and commerce (U.S. Const. art. II; Trade Act of 1974 § 151).
Underpinning the summit possibility is a complex framework: the Trade Act of 1974 grants the President “fast-track” negotiation authority, but Congress retains the power to modify or repeal tariff measures (19 U.S.C. § 2171(b)). Moreover, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to impose trade restrictions on national security grounds, yet mandates periodic Congressional review (50 U.S.C. § 1702). Thus, any decision to roll back or adjust existing tariffs hinges on intertwined executive discretion and legislative approval.
Simultaneously, broader societal tensions emerge—balancing American exporters’ demands for market access against domestic industries’ protectionist concerns. As Professor Susan Thornton, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, observes: “The crux of U.S.–China summit diplomacy is not only bilateral leverage but also navigating domestic constituencies that wield legal and political clout” (Thornton, 2023). Such statements underscore how summitry must account for competing interests: labor unions, technology firms, and allied partners in Asia.
This article will argue that convening a Trump–Xi summit in June 2025 exemplifies a multifaceted clash between constitutional separation of powers, statutory trade authorities, and evolving perceptions of national security. By unpacking legal precedents, historical analogues, and divergent views from political camps, the analysis will elucidate how this potential summit illuminates tensions at the intersection of diplomacy, law, and U.S. domestic politics.
LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The President’s authority to negotiate and implement trade agreements is rooted in Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which vests executive power in the President. Historically, that power has been circumscribed by Congress through statutes such as the Trade Act of 1974. Under Section 151 of the Act, the President may negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with foreign governments, subject to Congressional oversight and the requirement that Congress grant “fast-track” negotiating authority—limiting amendments and providing up or down votes for eventual implementing legislation (19 U.S.C. § 2171(b)) (Smith, 2020).
Simultaneously, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), enacted in 1977, empowers the President to regulate commerce after declaring a national emergency if a foreign threat endangers U.S. interests (50 U.S.C. § 1702). Tariffs imposed on Chinese goods in 2018 relied in part on IEEPA logic, as the Trump Administration cited national security concerns under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1862) (Jones, 2019). Yet, in 1980, INS v. Chadha clarified that legislative vetoes on executive actions violate bicameralism requirements, constraining Congressional attempts to unilaterally block tariff proclamations without bicameral statutes (462 U.S. 919, 942).
On international grounds, the United States joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, agreeing to dispute‐settlement obligations under the Marrakesh Agreement (WTO, 1994). Subsequent WTO challenges by China over Section 301 tariffs in 2018 (DS543) underscored that unilateral tariff escalations must align with WTO rules, or face specialized rulings. The WTO Appellate Body has noted that IEEPA‐based restrictions may still violate WTO obligations if not properly notified (Appellate Body Report, 2019).
Legal scholars such as Professor Joanne O. Brinkerhoff have written: “The 1974 and 1962 Acts together generate a legal architecture where the Executive can respond swiftly, but Congress retains structural levers to assert its commerce power” (Brinkerhoff, 2021). Moreover, judicial precedents—such as Chevron U.S.A. v. NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL (467 U.S. 837, 842)—influence how courts interpret agency deference when executive branches implement trade policies. Collectively, these statutes and decisions provide the foundation for understanding any adjustment to Sino‐American tariffs in anticipation of a June summit.
CASE STATUS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
While there is no formal “case” pending in a judicial forum regarding the Trump–Xi summit per se, a constellation of legal and governmental processes frames U.S. trade policy with China. First, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has initiated interagency consultations to prepare negotiating objectives. Pursuant to Section 103 of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA), the USTR notified Congress of its intent to negotiate bilateral tariff reductions, triggering 60 days of review before formal agreements (19 U.S.C. § 4203). During this period, Congressional committees held hearings on potential impacts for U.S. sectors, such as automotive and semiconductors (Senate Finance Committee Transcript, April 2025).
Meanwhile, legal challenges to existing tariffs remain active. In March 2025, the American Automotive Association filed suit in the U.S. Court of International Trade (Case No. 25-12) challenging Section 301 duties on Chinese‐manufactured electric vehicle components, arguing they exceed statutory authority under the Trade Act of 1974 (AAA v. USTR, amicus brief, March 2025). The lawsuit seeks injunctive relief to halt duty collection pending adjudication. The USTR responded that duties align with the statutory mandate to remedy “unfair trade practices” (USTR Response Brief, April 2025). A hearing is scheduled for July 2025, after the anticipated summit date, leaving open the question of whether any negotiated tariff rollback would moot or intersect with litigation.
Executive‐branch deliberations also involve continuous monitoring under Section 751 of the Trade Act of 1974, which requires periodic performance reviews of trade adjustment assistance programs for workers dislocated by China’s currency manipulation (19 U.S.C. § 2411). Congressional Democrats have circulated legislative proposals to widen Section 232 national security investigations, potentially complicating any pre‐summit concessions (House Ways and Means Report, May 2025).
Legal scholars note that, “without Congressional buy‐in—either through TPA authorization or amendment of existing tariff statutes—the Executive’s ability to effectuate sweeping changes will be constrained” (Fuchs, 2022). As it stands, the legal machinery is active: USTR listens to stakeholder input, federal courts entertain trade suits, and Congress debates legislation—all of which will shape any eventual summit outcomes.
VIEWPOINTS AND COMMENTARY
Progressive / Liberal Perspectives
Progressive and liberal commentators underscore concerns about human rights, fair labor standards, and environmental protections in U.S.–China trade arrangements. Civil rights organizations—such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Human Rights Watch (HRW)—have issued statements cautioning that any attempt to soften tariffs without securing enforceable commitments on forced labor in Xinjiang or Hong Kong democracy rights would amount to “turning a blind eye to systemic abuses” (HRW Press Release, March 2025). Legislators like Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) have publicly argued that “engaging in behind‐closed‐doors deals without transparent enforcement protocols risks undermining the moral standing of U.S. diplomacy” (Sen. Warren Floor Speech, April 15, 2025).
Economically, Democratic lawmakers stress the need to pair tariff adjustments with robust worker protections. Representative Pramila Jayapal (D-WA) stated: “Lowering duties on Chinese solar panels could benefit clean energy goals, but only if coupled with strict labor rights auditing to prevent exploitation” (Jayapal Press Statement, April 2025). In legal scholarship, Professor Linda J. Silberman from NYU School of Law notes that fair‐trade principles codified in Section 301 demand that any bilateral agreements include enforceable labor and environmental clauses, invoking the Trade Act’s § 307 provisions (Silberman, 2020).
Moreover, civil society groups argue that procedural transparency is paramount. A coalition of NGOs petitioned the USTR to hold public comment periods exceeding existing statutory requirements, warning that “closed‐door negotiations replicate a playbook of corporate lobbying where marginalized workers have no voice” (Petition to USTR, February 2025). They further cite precedent in United States v. Microsoft Corp. (253 F.3d 34, 2001) to insist that antitrust‐style transparency mechanisms be incorporated into trade talks to guard against private interests subverting public welfare (Foley, 2023).
On national security, “liberal hawks” such as former Under Secretary of Defense Michele Flournoy have advocated maintaining Section 232 tariffs on critical technology imports, arguing that “a wholesale rollback jeopardizes our semiconductor supply chains and prolongs dependence on Chinese state‐subsidized industries” (Flournoy, 2024). These voices emphasize that any summit outcome must integrate human rights and labor clauses, reaffirm existing WTO commitments, and preserve U.S. strategic posture in the Pacific.
Conservative / Right-Leaning Perspectives
Conservative and right-leaning analysis typically frames U.S.–China engagement through a lens of national security, American sovereignty, and economic protectionism. Republican lawmakers—including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY)—have championed robust tariffs as leverage to counter China’s alleged intellectual property theft and military modernization, insisting that “diplomacy without strength only emboldens adversaries” (Sen. McConnell Press Conference, March 2025). The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom has ranked China as “mostly unfree,” arguing that trade concessions absent concrete reforms would undermine U.S. economic security (Heritage Foundation, 2024).
On constitutional grounds, conservative legal scholars often cite originalist interpretations favoring executive prerogative in foreign affairs. Professor John Yoo of UC Berkeley’s Boalt Hall asserts: “The President’s authority under Article II is plenary when conducting diplomacy; statutory curbs imposed by Congress must be narrowly read to avoid usurpation of foreign‐policy leadership” (Yoo, 2018). Consequently, many conservative voices argue that Congress should not micromanage the summit’s negotiating agenda; instead, they assert that free‐market principles and executive agility are essential to extract favorable terms.
National security advocates, such as the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), emphasize that technology transfer controls—embodied in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. § 4802)—must remain stringent. CNAS Senior Fellow Mira Rapp-Hooper noted: “Relaxing export controls in the name of diplomacy risks accelerating PLA modernization and undercutting American dominance in critical tech sectors” (Rapp-Hooper, 2023). Likewise, conservative think tanks like the Cato Institute argue that tariffs function as a countermeasure against China’s state‐led industrial policy, labelling it “unfair competition” that necessitates ongoing executive flexibility (Adams, 2022).
Furthermore, some Republicans question the efficacy of summit diplomacy itself. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) remarked: “Historical precedents show that elite summits with Beijing rarely yield structural change; instead, they confer legitimacy on a regime that flouts human rights” (Sen. Cotton Floor Speech, April 2025). In legal journals, analysts such as Michael W. Dowd discuss how Congress can petition federal courts under the Administrative Procedure Act if the Executive implements or removes tariffs without proper notice or comment, potentially tying the President’s hands (Dowd, 2021).
Overall, right-leaning commentary contends that any Trump–Xi summit should solidify hardline positions, preserve existing “Phase One” commitments on intellectual property, and avoid premature tariff rollbacks that erode America’s bargaining power.
COMPARABLE OR HISTORICAL CASES
Scholars frequently compare potential Trump–Xi summit dynamics to President Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing, which marked a diplomatic breakthrough amid Cold War hostilities. At that time, Nixon possessed significant executive latitude to establish relations without Congressional treaties, relying on customary international law and Article II powers (Nixon, 1972). However, as constitutional historian Ernest May observed: “Nixon’s overture shifted geopolitical alignments, but required Congress to appropriate funding and pass the Sino‐U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty terms” (May, 1975). Similarly, any June 2025 summit must grapple with legal obligations under the Trade Act of 1974 and IEEPA, as well as Congressional appropriations for enforcement mechanisms.
Another analogy emerges from President Reagan’s 1984 summit with Premier Zhao Ziyang. Reagan’s administration had imposed Section 301 tariffs on Chinese steel in 1983; subsequent discussions led to a partial removal contingent on Chinese concessions on market access for agricultural products (Kilberg, 1988). In American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi (539 U.S. 396, 2003), the Supreme Court underscored that executive agreements, lacking Senate ratification, bind domestic agencies only to the extent Congress has enacted implementing legislation—highlighting that Reagan’s adjustments required statutory compliance.
In 2018, President Trump’s own “Phase One” trade deal with China reduced certain tariffs but left many in place pending Chinese agricultural and intellectual property reforms (USTR Report, January 2020). Legal scholar Robert E. Scott noted: “Phase One exemplified how executive discretion under Section 301 can be used to negotiate, but Congress retains power of the purse to influence enforcement” (Scott, 2020). Finally, the 1999 “Strategic Economic Dialogue” under President Clinton and Premier Zhu Rongji offers a smaller‐scale precedent. While not at the presidential level initially, these talks led to incremental tariff reductions and established a joint mechanism for dispute resolution (U.S.–China SED Joint Statement, 2000).
In each historical instance, the balance between executive diplomacy and Congressional authority proved pivotal. Past summits illustrate that without clear statutory authorization—and often without post hoc implementing legislation—the President’s unilateral commitments risked legal challenges or implementation gaps.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FORECASTING
A Trump–Xi summit in June 2025 carries significant short-term and long-term policy ramifications. In the near term, a summit could yield a roadmap for tariff de-escalation: for instance, phasing out 25% duties on $250 billion of Chinese imports in exchange for enforceable Chinese purchases of American agricultural goods. Yet any rollback requires action by Congress, potentially inviting months of legislative negotiation. Absent such action, administrative proclamations alone may prove insufficient to alter tariff schedules, raising uncertainty among businesses.
Long-term consequences pivot on geopolitical signaling. If President Trump publicly frames concessions as victory, domestic critics could argue that U.S. credibility suffered, especially allied partners in the Indo-Pacific wary of American reliability. Analyst Michael McFaul of Stanford University cautioned: “Allies will scrutinize if Beijing perceives this summit as U.S. weakness rather than strength. A miscalibrated peace offering risks emboldening Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea” (McFaul, 2024). Conversely, successful tariff reductions tied to enforceable commitments on human rights could improve U.S. soft power leverage.
Economic forecasts differ. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) models predict that a 50% reduction in tariffs could add $30 billion to U.S. GDP by 2026, bolstering consumer welfare (PIIE Report, January 2025). However, Moody’s Analytics warns of potential dislocation in domestic manufacturing, projecting a 0.2% decline in industrial output if low‐cost Chinese goods flood the market without protective safeguards (Moody’s, 2025).
Policy researchers also debate implications for technology competition. The Biden administration’s successor (whether Trump or another candidate) may interpret summit outcomes as precedent for future export control regimes. Richard Cooper of Harvard University has written: “Trade diplomacy with China must be paired with inward investment in R&D to prevent strategic overreliance. Without this balance, summit‐driven optimism dissipates quickly” (Cooper, 2023).
Ultimately, forecasting hinges on legislative will. If Congress passes a joint resolution endorsing negotiated terms, the summit may catalyze a durable détente. If not, the episode could amplify legal challenges and intensify partisan battles over U.S. trade policy, potentially fracturing bipartisan consensus on China strategy.
CONCLUSION
The prospect of a Trump–Xi summit in June 2025 crystallizes enduring constitutional and legal tensions: executive prerogative in foreign affairs versus Congressional authority over commerce and national security. As this analysis has shown, statutes such as the Trade Act of 1974, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and IEEPA collectively delineate a legal framework wherein the President can negotiate tariff adjustments, but Congress retains decisive powers to legislate, amend, or reject such measures. Historical analogues—from Nixon’s 1972 China opening to Reagan’s 1984 steel accords—illustrate that executive agreements lacking statutory implementability frequently encounter legislative resistance or implementation gaps.
Liberal perspectives emphasize human rights and labor standards, insisting on enforceable clauses to accompany any tariff rollback (Silberman, 2020). Conservative voices counter that maintaining strong tariff leverage is essential for national security and preserving intellectual property rights (Yoo, 2018). The realpolitik of summit diplomacy must reconcile these competing demands: securing Chinese concessions on forced labor, IP theft, and technology transfer, while accommodating domestic industry concerns and preserving alliances.
Given this balance, two core tensions emerge. First, can the Executive secure meaningful concessions from China without exceeding statutory authority, thereby triggering legal challenges or Congressional opposition? Second, will summithood generate genuine policy shifts or simply provide political cover for routine tariff adjustments? As Professor Michael Glennon of Tufts University notes: “The effectiveness of summit diplomacy hinges less on photo ops and more on clearly defined, legally enforceable commitments—embedded in acts of Congress rather than mere Executive proclamations” (Glennon, 2022).
In the months ahead, Congress’s stance will determine whether summit outcomes translate into durable trade policy or become symbolic gestures. The question remains: will U.S. institutions coalesce around a nuanced strategy that leverages summit diplomacy to recalibrate Sino‐American relations within legal bounds, or will partisan gridlock undermine prospective agreements? This juncture thus poses a fundamental inquiry for scholars and policymakers alike: How can the United States balance constitutional checks and balances, economic interests, and geopolitical imperatives in an era of strategic rivalry?
For Further Reading
- Trump, Xi Jinping Likely To Speak This Week Amid Tariff Tensions
- Donald Trump-Xi Jinping call likely to take place this week amid fresh trade tensions, White House confirms
- Trump tariffs live updates: Trump says China’s Xi is ‘extremely hard to make a deal with’
- Donald Trump To Speak With Xi Jinping On June 6 Amid US-China Tariff Tensions
- Xi Jinping livid with Donald Trump after massive Liberation Day tariffs on China; here’s what the Chinese President plans to do next
