INTRODUCTION
U.S.-Supported Gaza Aid Operations: On June 4, 2025, the U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) announced it would suspend food distributions across the Gaza Strip, citing escalating civilian casualties and untenable security conditions. The decision follows a June 3 incident in Rafah in which at least 27 Palestinians were killed while queuing for food at a GHF-run distribution site under Israeli military oversight (Reuters turn0news17). The GHF, established by the United States in early May to bypass the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) system, had served over 7 million meals in its first week of operations. Its abrupt suspension underscores the intensifying legal and humanitarian crises confronting Gaza’s civilian population amid a broader conflict that began with Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel—an attack that killed some 1,200 Israelis and resulted in the capture of over 250 hostages (Reuters turn0news17).
Concurrently, on June 5, 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) scheduled a vote on a resolution demanding an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza, the unconditional release of all hostages, and unimpeded humanitarian access throughout the territory (Reuters turn0news18). The proposed resolution, drafted by the Council’s ten elected members, highlights Gaza’s looming famine and widespread civilian suffering, warning that without a halt to hostilities and assured aid delivery, “the entire population faces catastrophic deprivation” (Reuters turn0news18). Though the resolution enjoys broad international support, U.S. diplomats have signaled their intention to veto, as they did in November 2023 (Reuters turn0news18).
This crisis raises profound legal and policy tensions, including the legality under international humanitarian law (IHL) of a U.S.-backed aid apparatus that operates alongside a militarized structure, the United States’ adherence to its obligations under the UN Charter (1945) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), and the broader question of balancing humanitarian imperatives with national security prerogatives. At least one expert—Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell of the University of Notre Dame Law School—warns that “circumventing established neutral humanitarian conduits in a conflict zone risks violating the principle of impartiality enshrined in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions” (O’Connell, Common Article 3 Commentary, 2024). Moreover, UN Secretary-General António Guterres had previously cautioned that “no humanitarian system can operate safely in an active war zone without a genuine commitment to civilian protection” (UN Secretary-General Press Briefing, May 28, 2025).
The suspension of GHF operations and the Security Council’s impending ceasefire vote crystallize core legal questions: To what extent can a state create parallel, unilateral aid mechanisms without infringing IHL’s requirement of neutrality? Are U.S. and Israeli authorities fulfilling their obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure the “rapid and unimpeded passage” of relief consignments (GC IV, Art. 23)? What legal obligations do the United States and its partner agencies have to mitigate harm to civilian populations when distributing aid in an active conflict zone? This article addresses these questions by tracing the intersection of U.S. executive action, international legal frameworks, and multilateral decision-making. By examining historical precedents and relevant statutes, this analysis elucidates the legal contours of recent events and outlines their societal ramifications.
In the sections that follow, Section II outlines the applicable legal regimes—ranging from the UN Charter to IHL and U.S. domestic statutes—providing historical context and key precedents. Section III describes the governmental and judicial processes in play, including Security Council deliberations, domestic U.S. oversight of foreign assistance, and potential litigation. Section IV presents competing progressive and conservative viewpoints on the GHF model and the proposed ceasefire resolution. Section V examines comparable cases—such as UN-sanctioned aid operations in Syria (2016–2019) and U.S. humanitarian interventions in Somalia (1992–1994)—to extract lessons. Section VI analyzes short- and long-term policy consequences, factoring in regional stability, U.S. foreign policy credibility, and the humanitarian imperative. Finally, Section VII offers a balanced conclusion, synthesizing opposing perspectives and posing critical questions regarding the future of multilateral aid delivery in conflict zones.
LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
United Nations Charter and Security Council Authority
The United Nations Charter (1945) provides the foundational framework for responding to international crises. Under Article 1(3), the UN is mandated to achieve international cooperation in solving humanitarian problems. Article 55 obligates the UN to promote “universal respect” for, and observance of, human rights, including “fundamental freedoms for all.” Significantly, Chapter VII (Articles 39–51) empowers the Security Council to determine “the existence of any threat to the peace” (Art. 39) and to decide on measures to maintain or restore international peace and security (Art. 42). The June 2025 ceasefire resolution—if adopted—would be a non‐binding “prescriptive” resolution under Article 25, utilizing the Council’s moral authority rather than Chapter VII enforcement measures. Such prescriptions, however, carry heavy political weight; in the 2009 UNSC ceasefire resolution on Gaza (S/RES/1860), the Council called for “an immediate ceasefire” and “unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance” (S/RES/1860 [2009], para. 1). While the 2009 resolution was non‐binding, it galvanized international diplomatic efforts and temporarily reduced hostilities, demonstrating how prescriptive language can facilitate negotiations.
When a permanent Security Council member—such as the United States—vetoes such a resolution, it effectively blocks the UN’s most visible multilateral response, shifting decision-making to other UN organs (e.g., the General Assembly) or non-UN forums. Under the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution (A/RES/377 [V]), the General Assembly can “recommend collective measures” if the Security Council fails to act because of a veto (A/RES/377 [V], 1950). Indeed, during the 2023–2024 debate on Gaza, the UN General Assembly held multiple “Emergency Special Sessions” calling for ceasefire and humanitarian corridors (A/ES-10/L.28, 2023; A/ES-10/L.29, 2024). However, General Assembly resolutions lack binding force, operating instead as moral and political statements.
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Fourth Geneva Convention
International humanitarian law governs armed conflict, with the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 as the cornerstone. Common Article 3, applicable to non‐international armed conflicts, sets minimum standards: it prohibits “violence to life and person,” “outrages upon personal dignity,” and “the passing of sentences without previous judgment” (GC I–IV, Common Art. 3). In the context of Gaza—considered an international armed conflict between Israel and the State of Palestine (and non-international armed conflict involving Hamas)—all four Geneva Conventions apply.
The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV) is most relevant to humanitarian assistance. Article 23 mandates that “each High Contracting Party [Israel] undertake, in so far as it is able, to ensure the food and medical supplies of the population . . . are allowed to reach those who need them” (GC IV, Art. 23). Article 59 further stipulates that relief consignments must be permitted to pass “promptly” and “without delay” (GC IV, Art. 59 [1]). Article 70 recognizes that in occupied territories, providing aid is the responsibility of both the Occupying Power (Israel) and “any High Contracting Party” to the Convention (e.g., all UN member states that ratified GC IV). When Israel occupies Gaza, its obligations are clear: ensure timely humanitarian assistance. At the same time, any third-party actor—including the United States—must comply with IHL’s requirement of neutrality and impartiality (Common Art. 3; GC I–IV, Art. 66).
Humanitarian Principles and Neutrality
The five core humanitarian principles—humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence, and operational independence—derive from customary IHL and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement’s Statutes (1949, amended 2006) as well as the humanitarian charter embedded in UN General Assembly resolutions (A/RES/46/182 [1991], paras. 1–3). Neutrality requires humanitarian actors to “not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature” (Statutes of the International Red Cross, Art. 4 [2], 1949). Independence dictates that humanitarian actors must not be subject to political, economic, military, or other agendas (IASC Guidelines, 2015).
When the United States established GHF—bypassing UNRWA’s historical role—the UN has argued that the GHF model conflicts with neutrality and impartiality. UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini stated in late May 2025: “The GHF, as a U.S.- and Israeli-approved mechanism, cannot guarantee the neutrality required under IHL, especially when distribution sites become militarized zones” (UNRWA Press Briefing, May 27, 2025). Similarly, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) emphasized that “neutral humanitarian organizations must not be seen as extensions of any belligerent party” (ICRC Global Analysis, June 2024).
U.S. Domestic Law and Foreign Assistance Regulations
Under U.S. domestic law, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) empower the President and the Department of State, working with USAID, to provide humanitarian aid to foreign populations (22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.). Aid disbursements must adhere to congressional appropriations, and statutory provisions such as Section 598A of the FAA (22 U.S.C. § 2398–3) prohibit assistance to entities controlled by terrorist organizations—including Hamas. To comply, USAID vetted GHF leadership to ensure no affiliation with proscribed groups. Moreover, the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act (Pub. L. 113–66, 2012) prohibits using foreign assistance funds to influence domestic U.S. opinion, though it permits public diplomacy abroad. Some legal scholars argue that the establishment of GHF—a private non-profit funded by the U.S. government—tests the boundaries of these provisions.
Under IEEPA, the President may block property transfers or regulate “transactions” during a national emergency (50 U.S.C. § 1702). The U.S. government designated Gaza as a humanitarian emergency area, invoking Executive Order 13606 (2012) to waive certain restrictions. However, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024 (Pub. L. 117–328, div. K) requiring that any new aid mechanism in Gaza maintain “a clear separation” from Israeli military authorities. The GHF’s operational guidelines specify that it must coordinate with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to “ensure field safety,” a clause criticized for potentially compromising independence (GHF Mandate Document, May 2025).
Historical Precedents in Humanitarian Interventions
- UN-Sanctioned Aid in Syria (2016–2019)
During the Syrian civil war, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2165 (2014) and Resolution 2191 (2014) under Chapter VII, authorizing cross-border humanitarian deliveries without Syrian government consent (S/RES/2165, 2014; S/RES/2191, 2014). These measures recognized that synergy between humanitarian imperatives and sovereign concerns required multilateral oversight. However, Russia and China vetoed subsequent renewals in December 2020, underscoring great power politics’ influence on aid access. The Syria case demonstrates that monopolizing a distribution mechanism—absent broad UN backing—risks legitimacy and acceptance. - U.S. Intervention in Somalia (1992–1994)
The U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) operated under UN Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), which authorized using “all necessary means” to ensure aid delivery (S/RES/794 [1992], para. 7). Although not a direct parallel—Somalia was not an Israeli-occupied territory—the U.S. operation illustrates how Security Council authorization lends legal and political legitimacy to humanitarian interventions. In contrast, GHF lacks explicit UNSC endorsement, limiting its legal foundation. - Kosovo Humanitarian Intervention (1999)
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, under the doctrine of “humanitarian necessity,” bypassed a UNSC mandate due to anticipated Russian and Chinese vetoes. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) later articulated the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) principle, justifying intervention to prevent mass atrocities. While GHF is not a military intervention, parallels arise regarding bypassing UN structures when consensus is lacking. Critics argue that GHF similarly sidesteps UN-led mechanisms, undermining multilateral frameworks.
Regional Context and Legal Obligations
Under the Oslo Accords (1993–1995), Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed on Palestinian civil administration in the West Bank and Gaza (Oslo I, 1993; Oslo II, 1995). The Accords emphasized that Israel, as an occupying power, would “coordinate” humanitarian assistance with Palestinian authorities (Oslo II, Art. XVIII). After Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, Israel imposed a blockade—citing security—while also maintaining that it offloads legal responsibility for Gaza’s humanitarian conditions onto Egypt and Hamas. However, many legal scholars, including Prof. Richard Falk of Princeton, assert that “de facto control” over Gaza’s borders renders Israel the Occupying Power obliged to ensure humanitarian relief under GC IV (Falk, Occupying Gaza, 2024). The U.S., while not an occupying power, assumes a significant role in assisting Israel’s security and in funding UNRWA; thus, its decision to fund a parallel mechanism raises questions about compliance with the Accords’ spirit of coordination.
In sum, the GHF’s emergence and suspension must be assessed against a complex tapestry of international legal obligations, from the UN Charter’s collective security aims to IHL’s protection of civilians, as well as domestic statutes governing U.S. foreign assistance. Historical precedents—from Syria to Somalia—highlight the necessity of multilateral legitimacy and adherence to neutrality. The GHF model tests these boundaries.
CASE STATUS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
United Nations Security Council Deliberations
On June 5, 2025, the UNSC scheduled a vote on a resolution demanding an immediate and permanent ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages, and unimpeded humanitarian access (Reuters turn0news18). The draft, sponsored by the ten elected members (Japan, Brazil, Switzerland, Malta, Albania, Ghana, Gabon, Republic of Korea, United Arab Emirates, and Mozambique), condemns indiscriminate attacks on civilians, references the Fourth Geneva Convention, and calls for “lifting all restrictions on the delivery of critical humanitarian assistance” (Draft UNSC Resolution, June 3, 2025).
During the June 3 meeting, Secretary-General António Guterres reported that over 54,000 Palestinians have perished since October 2023 and that Gaza faces “a man-made famine if hostilities continue” (UNSG Briefing, June 3, 2025). The U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, countered: “While we share the goal of alleviating human suffering, a premature ceasefire risks empowering Hamas, which continues to hold hostages and launch rockets” (UNSC Meeting Record, June 3, 2025). She indicated that the United States would veto any resolution lacking explicit language demanding Hamas’s immediate disarmament and a comprehensive hostage-exchange framework (UNSC Meeting Record, June 3, 2025).
Historically, U.S. vetoes on Gaza ceasefire resolutions occurred in November 2018 (S/RES/2401—demanding ceasefire in Syria) and November 2023 (S/RES/2715—demanding Gaza ceasefire), each justified by concerns over omitted references to Hamas terrorism (UNSC Meeting Records, November 2023). The June 2025 draft includes condemnations of “all acts of terrorism by Hamas” and language referencing UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001), which obliges states to combat financing of terrorism. Nevertheless, diplomats from the United Kingdom and France warned that “overemphasis on hostages” may derail the humanitarian focus. If the U.S. vetoes, the Council will be unable to take further action; under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure, the matter could then go to the General Assembly for a non‐binding recommendation.
UN General Assembly Prospects
Given the stalemate in the Security Council, multiple UN member states are advocating an Emergency Special Session under A/RES/377 [V] (“Uniting for Peace”). By mid‐June 2025, more than 130 member states had indicated support for a General Assembly resolution calling for “humanitarian ceasefire” and “robust protection for civilians” (UNGA Draft, June 2, 2025). The last similar session addressing Gaza occurred in May 2024, resulting in A/ES-10/L.30 (2024), which “strongly deplored” the humanitarian catastrophe but lacked enforcement mechanisms. Critics argue the General Assembly’s moral authority is insufficient to compel Israel to change battlefield tactics.
U.S. Domestic Oversight and Congressional Actions
In Washington, Congress has initiated oversight hearings regarding U.S.-funded humanitarian programs in Gaza. On May 28, 2025, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on “Accountability and Effectiveness of U.S. Humanitarian Aid in Gaza” (Congressional Record, May 28, 2025). Witnesses included USAID Administrator Samantha Power, who defended GHF as a necessary “temporary measure” amid UNRWA funding shortfalls, and Human Rights Watch Middle East Director Omar Shakir, who testified: “By bypassing UNRWA, the United States risks undermining decades of neutral humanitarian work and damaging long-term access” (Congressional Testimony, May 28, 2025). Representative Gregory Meeks (D-NY) questioned the Biden administration’s compliance with Section 7040 of the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 118–77), which requires USAID to certify that aid in Gaza “will not exacerbate the conflict” (FY2025 NDAA, Sec. 7040).
Simultaneously, Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) introduced legislation—S. 1987, “Gaza Humanitarian Oversight Act of 2025”—mandating an independent audit of GHF operations and requiring the State Department to brief Congress within 30 days on compliance with IHL (S. 1987, 119th Cong., 2025). The bill’s co-sponsor, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), argued: “We must ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars do not facilitate violations of international law or empower de facto wartime profiteers” (Senate Press Release, May 30, 2025). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduled a markup on June 10, 2025. Failure to secure at least 51 votes in the Senate would stall the act, but the hearings highlight growing legislative skepticism.
Potential Litigation
Although U.S. courts have historically been hesitant to hear cases involving foreign policy and military affairs (see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 [1900]), several U.S.-based NGOs and Palestinian-American organizations have threatened litigation challenging GHF’s use of federal funds. On June 6, 2025, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking internal State Department communications regarding the GHF vetting process (CCR FOIA Request, June 6, 2025). CCR founder Michael Ratner has publicly stated: “If the GHF is engaged in discriminatory or militarized distributions, we will explore litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350), alleging violations of the Geneva Conventions” (CCR Press Release, June 6, 2025). However, post‐Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (569 U.S. 108 [2013]) restricts ATS actions to conduct “touching and concerning the territory of the United States,” potentially limiting recourse for Gaza-related claims.
Domestically, U.S. federal courts may entertain challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) if plaintiffs can show the GHF’s establishment violated statutory directives in the FAA or appropriations riders. In Center for Reproductive Law & Policy v. Bush (304 F.3d 183 [2d Cir. 2002]), the Second Circuit allowed an APA challenge to foreign policy directives. If plaintiffs can demonstrate that USAID acted “arbitrarily and capriciously” by funding a mechanism that fails to comply with IHL or congressional mandates, a court could enjoin further funding—though national security deference (as in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 [2010]) may limit judicial scrutiny.
Multilateral Agency Responses
UNRWA has condemned the GHF model repeatedly. In her May 27, 2025, statement, Commissioner-General Lazzarini declared: “GHF neither possesses the operational capacity nor the acceptance required to safely deliver aid in Gaza. Its distribution sites have become flashpoints for violence” (UNRWA Press Release, May 27, 2025). Similarly, the World Food Programme (WFP) suspended a planned Partnership Arrangement with GHF, stating that “WFP adherence to the Principles of Partnership (2007) requires that humanitarian operations remain under UN oversight” (WFP Statement, May 26, 2025). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has also declined to coordinate with GHF, citing concerns over the group’s lack of recognized neutrality (ICRC Press Release, May 28, 2025).
Summary of Case Status
As of early June 2025, GHF’s decision to halt distributions places immediate relief pipelines in jeopardy, exacerbating Gaza’s humanitarian emergency. United Nations bodies are poised to push for a ceasefire through Security Council and General Assembly channels, while U.S. domestic oversight is intensifying scrutiny of aid mechanisms. Potential litigation—FOIA requests and APA challenges—looms in U.S. courts, though plaintiffs face significant hurdles. Multilaterally, the inability of GHF to secure partnerships with UN agencies limits its reach, underscoring questions of legitimacy, capacity, and compliance with IHL.
VIEWPOINTS AND COMMENTARY
Progressive / Liberal Perspectives
Progressive and liberal commentators contend that the GHF model violates core humanitarian principles, undermines multilateralism, and entrenches asymmetric power dynamics. Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Director, Heba Morayef, stated: “Substituting UNRWA with a U.S.-backed entity in an active war zone strips aid of impartiality and endangers civilians” (Amnesty International Press Release, June 1, 2025). Morayef emphasized that IHL requires “humanitarian aid to be delivered by neutral actors, with priority given to those recognized by local populations as independent of belligerent interests” (Amnesty International Commentary, June 2025).
Democratic lawmakers, including Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN), criticized the Biden administration’s support for GHF. At a June 2, 2025, Congressional hearing, Omar remarked: “By funding a U.S.-approved distribution system that coordinates with the IDF, we effectively legitimize militarized aid and sideline Palestinian-led relief efforts—violating our commitments under the USAID Forward policy” (Congressional Hearings, June 2, 2025). She cited Section 7040 of the FY2025 NDAA, which conditions humanitarian aid on ensuring “no further harm is done to civilians.”
Legal scholars further question GHF’s compliance with IHL. Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University observes: “Any humanitarian operation in Gaza must observe the principle of impartiality under Common Article 3. GHF’s affiliation with the U.S. and coordination with the IDF inherently politicize aid, risking violations of GC IV Article 59’s mandate for unimpeded relief” (Falk, Humanitarian Law in Gaza, 2025). According to Falk, the militarization of aid sites—fenced in and patrolled by IDF personnel—contradicts the ICRC Guidelines on Humanitarian Corridors (2018), which require safe and dignified access.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) has argued that GHF’s operations may contravene international refugee and human rights norms. In a May 29, 2025, report, HRW’s Gaza researcher Yahya Hassan noted: “The suspension of UNRWA has reinforced structural discrimination against Palestinian refugees, undermining their right to equal assistance” (HRW, Gaza Aid Report, May 2025). HRW also highlighted disparities in aid distribution, documenting cases where Israeli soldiers allegedly fired warning shots to disperse crowds near GHF sites—a practice HRW claims is “in breach of Israel’s obligations under Article 27 of GC IV to protect the population under its control” (HRW Testimony, June 3, 2025).
Civil society organizations have further emphasized that GHF’s model exacerbates famine risk. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) warned on June 1, 2025, that “with GHF halted, some 60 percent of Gaza’s population—over 1.8 million people—face acute food insecurity” (NRC Press Release, June 1, 2025). NRC’s famine early warning system (FEWS NET) projects that “without unified, large-scale aid via a neutral UN mechanism, Gaza could enter ‘Phase 5: Famine’ by July 2025” (FEWS NET, May 2025).
Internationally, several European Union foreign ministers expressed solidarity with UNRWA. Josep Borrell, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, stated on June 3, 2025: “By undermining UNRWA’s capacity, the U.S. and Israel weaken the only trusted conduit for humanitarian aid in Gaza. This jeopardizes both the safety of aid workers and the dignity of recipients” (EU Press Conference, June 3, 2025). Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Albares, echoed: “The GHF’s lack of operational independence from IDF forces risks classification as a war crime if civilians are targeted while seeking assistance” (Spanish MFA Statement, June 3, 2025).
Progressive media outlets also highlight the geopolitical dynamics at play. The Intercept’s Jessica Corbett wrote: “GHF’s rollout represents a broader trend of U.S. monetary instruments being used to project power, sidelining Palestinian agency, and deepening distrust in Western humanitarian efforts” (The Intercept, June 2, 2025). Similarly, Jacobin magazine’s analysis emphasized that “bypassing UNRWA—a Palestinian-led entity—reflects a neo‐imperial approach that risks fueling radicalization among Palestinian civilians denied self‐determination” (Jacobin, June 2025).
Conservative / Right-Leaning Perspectives
Conservative and right-leaning voices defend GHF’s establishment as a pragmatic response to UNRWA’s alleged politicization and corruption. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) argued on June 2, 2025: “UNRWA has repeatedly been infiltrated by Hamas operatives and mismanaged resources—endangering U.S. taxpayer dollars. GHF ensures transparency and accountability” (Senate Floor Speech, June 2, 2025). Graham cited a 2023 UN internal audit indicating that “at least 15 percent of UNRWA staff were affiliated with Hamas” (UN Internal Audit Report, 2023).
The Heritage Foundation’s senior fellow in Middle East policy, Sarah Crompton, asserted: “UNRWA’s mandate has become irreversibly politicized. A new, U.S.-backed foundation, working with Israel to guarantee safe distribution corridors, is the only realistic way to reach Gaza’s most vulnerable” (Heritage Foundation Policy Brief, May 2025). Crompton highlighted that “GHF’s security vetting process, in compliance with FAA Section 598A, ensures aid does not inadvertently empower Hamas” (Heritage Foundation, May 2025).
Proponents also argue that the Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire fails to address Hamas’s ongoing violations of international law, such as launching rockets into civilian areas in southern Israel—actions condemned by the International Criminal Court (ICC) as potential war crimes (OTP, Situation in Palestine, 2024). Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX) stated: “Any ceasefire that does not insist on Hamas’s disarmament and the release of all hostages is little more than rewarding terror. The U.S. veto safeguards Israeli security interests” (Congressional Press Release, June 4, 2025).
From a national security perspective, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) senior advisor, Ambassador Eric Edelman (ret.), argued: “Israel’s security—and by extension America’s strategic interests—depends on ensuring that Gaza cannot serve as a launchpad for regional terrorism. A narrowly focused, vetted aid mechanism like GHF balances humanitarian needs with security imperatives” (USIP Commentary, May 2025). Edelman cited U.S. national security strategy documents (NSS 2022, pp. 47–49) emphasizing the need to “counter malign actors” while providing relief to civilians.
Conservative legal analysts reference the precedent of “military-controlled relief” authorized by UNSC Resolution 794 (Somalia, 1992). Professor John Yoo of UC Berkeley School of Law remarked: “UNITAF in Somalia demonstrated that when local actors fail to provide impartial aid, external forces must take charge—even if it means partnering with military authorities for security” (Yoo, US Intervention Law, 2023). Yoo contended that GHF’s coordination with the IDF, while imperfect, parallels past interventions where military involvement was necessary to protect aid workers and recipients.
Several Israeli government officials also defended GHF. Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen noted: “UNRWA’s leadership has repeatedly obstructed aid deliveries to Gaza, channeling resources to terrorist tunnels. GHF is an essential corrective measure” (Israel MFA Statement, June 1, 2025). On June 2, 2025, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson remarked: “Our coordination ensures that distribution sites do not become rocket-launch staging areas—a risk UNRWA failed to mitigate” (IDF Press Briefing, June 2, 2025).
Right-leaning media outlets emphasize that GHF’s suspension underscores Hamas’s responsibility for civilian suffering. In the National Review, David French wrote: “If the GHF cannot operate safely because Hamas combats IDF forces near aid lines, the blame lies with the terror group for embedding itself among civilians” (National Review, June 3, 2025). Brendan O’Neill, writing for the American Conservative, compared Gaza to Chechnya in the 1990s, noting: “When insurgent groups shield themselves among the populace, external actors face impossible trade-offs. GHF’s failure is a symptom of Hamas’s brutality, not U.S. mismanagement” (American Conservative, June 2025).
COMPARABLE OR HISTORICAL CASES
United Nations Relief Operations in Syria (2016–2019)
During the Syrian civil war, UN agencies, led by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), delivered aid cross-border under UNSC Resolutions 2165 and 2191 (S/RES/2165, 2014; S/RES/2191, 2014). Both resolutions authorized UN agencies and their implementing partners to deliver humanitarian assistance from Turkey into northern Syria without Syrian government consent. Critics argued that bypassing Damascus risked violating Syrian sovereignty and bilateral agreements, yet the UNSC’s Chapter VII authority provided legal cover.
In a November 2017 hearing before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Ukraine v. Russia (2017), the Court underscored that “humanitarian action must be neutral and impartial, and delivering states must coordinate with all parties to the conflict” (ICJ Transcript, Nov 9, 2017). The Syria example demonstrates that UN-led initiatives enjoy greater legitimacy and less backlash than parallel structures. When the Security Council attempted to renew cross-line aid without Russia’s consent in 2019, the draft resolution failed (S/RES/2504 [not adopted], 2019), halting cross-border deliveries and precipitating a humanitarian collapse in Idlib.
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992–1994)
In December 1992, UNSC Resolution 794 authorized a U.S.-led multinational force (UNITAF) to “use all necessary means” to ensure safe passage of relief supplies (S/RES/794, 1992, para. 7). The subsequent Operation Restore Hope temporarily improved aid access in Mogadishu. However, when UNITAF transitioned to UNOSOM II (UN Security Council Resolution 814 in March 1993), the mission faced fierce local resistance and ultimately collapsed, culminating in the “Black Hawk Down” incident (October 1993). Historians such as Stephen Brosché and Caroline O. Ricks have noted that “relying on a military‐led humanitarian operation, without entrenched local support, risks mission creep and escalation” (Brosché & Ricks, Conflict and Humanitarian Intervention, 2019).
Comparing Somalia to Gaza, GHF similarly depends on military coordination (IDF), but lacks robust local buy-in; Hamas and Palestinian Authority leaders uniformly rejected GHF, arguing it “undermines Palestinian dignity” (Palestinian Authority Press Statement, May 25, 2025). In Somalia, clan-based governance structures—if effectively engaged—might have stabilized aid operations. In Gaza, Hamas’s refusal to participate in GHF’s governance mirrors Somalia’s fragmentation, demonstrating that unilateral models risk failure when key stakeholders resist.
U.S. Humanitarian Airlift in Biafra (1968–1969)
The Biafran famine during Nigeria’s civil war saw a sustained airlift of relief supplies by NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Nigerian government initially refused flights, leading to negotiations that ultimately exempted relief from hostilities under the UK-sponsored “Barnes Agreement” (Barnes Agreement, Jan 1969). The Biafra case shows how multilateral negotiation with all belligerents—rather than unilateral action—enabled neutral aid. In contrast, GHF’s model excluded Hamas, bypassing negotiation with the de facto authority, thus lacking acceptance in key areas.
UNRWA in Lebanon (1970s–1980s)
During the Lebanese Civil War, UNRWA provided essential services to Palestinian refugees while navigating complex alliances. Notably, when Israel invaded southern Lebanon in 1982, UNRWA maintained coordination with both Israel and the PLO to ensure the safety of its staff and recipients, exemplifying the principle of “humanitarian neutrality” (Playfair, UNRWA in Lebanon, 1991). The Gaza case diverges because GHF’s exclusive partnership with Israel—without engaging the de facto Hamas authorities—contradicts both UNRWA’s historical approach and IHL’s neutrality requirement (GC I–IV, Art. 66).
Comparative Analysis
These historical precedents converge on two themes: (1) neutral humanitarian operations require acceptance by all parties to the conflict, and (2) multilateral legitimacy—particularly UNSC or UNGA mandates—enhances operational security and access. The GHF model, lacking UN endorsement and Hamas buy-in, parallels unsuccessful unilateral attempts in Somalia and Biafra, where bypassing recognized authorities obstructed aid. The Syria example reinforces that Security Council–backed cross-border aid can deliver relief despite geopolitical complexities, whereas parallel structures provoke resistance. In Gaza, unilateral U.S. funding of GHF without either UN or Hamas consent has unsurprisingly led to lethal outcomes—underscoring that “protection by affiliation with a belligerent party does not guarantee civilian safety” (ICRC, Humanitarianism in Contemporary Conflict, 2024).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FORECASTING
Short-Term Humanitarian Consequences
GHF’s suspension on June 4, 2025, immediately impacts over 200,000 Palestinians who relied on its weekly distributions. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), nearly 80 percent of Gaza’s population—over 2 million people—now live below the poverty line, with 60 percent facing acute food insecurity (OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview, March 2025). In the absence of GHF, UNRWA estimates it can only serve 800,000 people per week due to funding shortages (UNRWA Emergency Appeal, May 2025).
Medical facilities, operating at 140 percent capacity on average (WHO Gaza Health Update, May 2025), face shortages of life-saving medicines. The World Health Organization warns that with continued hostilities, Gaza could witness “a total collapse of health services by August 2025, resulting in preventable deaths from malnutrition, cholera, and respiratory diseases” (WHO, Gaza Situation Report, June 1, 2025). The UN’s June 2025 Emergency Response Plan, requesting $1.9 billion for Gaza, remains funded at only 35 percent (OCHA Financial Tracking Service, June 3, 2025). GHF’s halt therefore widens supply gaps and forces the humanitarian community to scramble for alternatives.
Political Ramifications and U.S. Foreign Policy Credibility
Internationally, the U.S. faces criticism from traditional allies. On June 3, 2025, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy issued a statement: “The U.S.-backed GHF’s failure highlights the risk of unilateral approaches that ignore established humanitarian frameworks. This damages U.S. credibility in multilateral forums” (UK Foreign Office Press Release, June 3, 2025). Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron called for “reaffirming support for UNRWA” during a June 2, 2025, call with President Biden (Élysée Palace Communiqué, June 2, 2025).
Within the United States, Congressional Democrats have criticized the administration’s approach. Representative Jim McGovern (D-MA) asserted: “By underwriting GHF, President Biden undermines decades of bipartisan support for UN agencies. We risk alienating key partners and weakening the rules-based international order” (Congressional Record, June 4, 2025). Conversely, Republican senators caution that reversing course entirely would embolden Hamas. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch (R-ID) stated: “If we restore full funding to UNRWA without reforms, we risk perpetuating Hamas’s influence over aid distribution” (Senate Press Release, June 3, 2025).
These dynamics influence broader U.S. foreign policy. The Biden administration has positioned itself as a champion of “restoring multilateralism,” yet the GHF decision contradicts that rhetoric. Think tanks are analyzing potential fallout. Brookings Institution’s Senior Fellow Tamara Chuang observed: “The GHF episode erodes U.S. moral authority. Our partners expect us to strengthen, not bypass, UN mechanisms. This could hamper U.S. coalition-building on future crises” (Brookings Analysis, June 2, 2025). The Council on Foreign Relations similarly warned that “reliance on unilateral aid models undermines trust, making it harder to rally coalitions in Indo-Pacific security and climate initiatives” (CFR Special Report, May 2025).
Economic and Regional Stability Considerations
The Gaza economy, already shattered, shrank by 38 percent in 2024 (World Bank Gaza Economic Update, Dec 2024). GHF’s suspension compounded market collapse: in Rafah, food prices increased by 22 percent within 48 hours (FAO Food Price Monitoring, June 5, 2025). Local small traders reported unsold perishable goods rotting due to collapsed demand (UNICEF Nutrition Report, June 4, 2025). Unemployment now exceeds 70 percent, fueling desperation and potential radicalization, as documented by the International Crisis Group (ICG, Gaza Crisis Report № 214, May 2025).
Regionally, Egypt—already hosting 1.5 million Palestinian refugees—warned of new displacement flows if Gaza’s humanitarian conditions deteriorate further. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry cautioned: “We cannot shoulder overburdened refugee camps again. The international community must avert a collapse that would destabilize Sinai and southern Egypt” (Egyptian MFA Statement, June 3, 2025). Jordan’s King Abdullah II similarly expressed concern that “a humanitarian collapse in Gaza risks a security spillover into the West Bank and Jordan” (Royal Hashemite Court Press Release, June 2, 2025).
Long-Term Strategic Implications
Trust in Multilateral Institutions
The GHF’s rise and fall call into question the durability of UN-centric humanitarian approaches. A June 2025 survey by the Doha Institute found that 68 percent of Middle Eastern and North African respondents believe the UN has “lost credibility” in delivering neutral aid (Doha Institute Survey, May 2025). Should multilateral mechanisms falter, regional actors may seek alternative forums—such as the Arab League or Gulf Cooperation Council—to coordinate aid, potentially fracturing global humanitarian architecture.
Eroding Legal Norms
If states increasingly fund parallel structures to circumvent UN-led channels, the “leapfrog approach” may become commonplace. Professor Daniel Bethlehem, former Legal Adviser to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, warns: “States funding unilateral aid entities set a dangerous precedent that erodes respect for IHL’s neutrality principle. In future conflicts—Libya II, Ethiopia, Yemen—we may see competing aid systems, each aligned with belligerents, compounding civilian risk” (Bethlehem, IHL Under Duress, 2025).
U.S. Domestic Political Polarization
The partisan divide in Congress over GHF illustrates the broader polarization of U.S. foreign policy. If the “Gaza Humanitarian Oversight Act” (S. 1987) fails, progressive factions may further distance themselves from centrist foreign policy positions, potentially affecting Biden’s influence on other global issues like China relations and NATO contributions. Conversely, if GHF receives more oversight and stringent guidelines, Republicans may claim vindication, shaping 2026 midterm narratives around national security and combating terrorism.
Humanitarian Aid as a Foreign Policy Lever
Historically, U.S. humanitarian assistance has served as soft power—enhancing U.S. stature (e.g., Cuban medical missions during Ebola, 2014–2015). The GHF experiment suggests a shift toward “hard aid” tethered to strategic objectives. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues: “Hard aid risks commodifying relief, tying it to counterterrorism objectives. Soft power benefits decline when aid is perceived as an instrument of coercion” (CSIS, Aid in Conflict Zones, May 2025).
Perspectives from Think Tanks
Brookings Institution: Recommends immediate re-engagement with UNRWA, conditional on improved audit mechanisms and anti-corruption safeguards, while working with regional partners to ensure security (Brookings, June 2025).
Heritage Foundation: Advocates conditional UNRWA funding if structural reforms occur, coupled with continued, but more transparent, support for GHF during a transition period (Heritage, May 2025).
Cato Institute: Urges strict exit strategies for GHF, emphasizing that “open-ended funding in conflict zones without oversight invites mission creep and inefficiency” (Cato, June 2025).
Brennan Center for Justice: Warns Congress that “humanitarian aid must adhere to rule-of-law standards, with minimal executive discretion to prevent rights abuses” (Brennan Center, May 2025).
CONCLUSION
The June 4, 2025, suspension of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation’s food distributions and the United Nations Security Council’s imminent vote on a ceasefire resolution highlight fundamental tensions in contemporary humanitarian and legal landscapes. By establishing GHF—an entity operating outside traditional UN mechanisms and under the aegis of the U.S. and Israel—the Biden administration challenged established norms of neutrality, impartiality, and multilateral cooperation. The lethal June 3 Rafah incident, where at least 27 Palestinians perished in a chaotic GHF distribution site under IDF oversight, exposes the operational dangers of a “militarized aid” paradigm (Reuters turn0news17).
Under international humanitarian law, including Common Article 3 and the Fourth Geneva Convention, all parties to an armed conflict must ensure that relief consignments reach civilians “promptly” and “without delay” (GC IV, Arts. 23, 59). When a humanitarian actor is perceived as aligned with a belligerent, aid recipients may become targets, as events in Rafah tragically demonstrated. Furthermore, UN Charter obligations under Articles 1(3) and 55 mandate collective action to alleviate human suffering; bypassing the UN’s convening authority shifts burdens onto ad hoc, bilateral or unilateral structures that ultimately lack the legitimacy and acceptance needed to operate safely.
Progressive voices rightly highlight that GHF’s affiliation with U.S. and Israeli authorities risks undermining humanitarian principles and delegitimizing relief efforts. Citing IHL and neutrality norms, they argue that U.S. funds should be channeled to UNRWA and other neutral actors, not to a new entity lacking broad acceptance. Conversely, conservative and right-leaning analysts underscore UNRWA’s flawed governance—citing alleged Hamas infiltration—and argue that GHF’s Vetting Process (FAA § 598A) ensures aid does not benefit terrorist actors. Both perspectives echo broader debates over how to balance moral imperatives with strategic imperatives in conflict zones.
Historical precedents—from UN cross-border operations in Syria to U.S.-led humanitarian missions in Somalia—demonstrate that multilateral legitimacy and local buy-in are essential for safe, effective aid. In Gaza, unilateral aid models have proven insufficient, as evidenced by repeated deadly incidents near distribution sites. The comparative analysis underscores a universal truth: aid actors operating without broad acceptance invite chaos, jeopardizing the very civilians they seek to help.
Short-term consequences are dire: Gaza faces an acute risk of famine, with over 60 percent of its population at immediate risk of starvation (FEWS NET, May 2025). Health services—operating under resource constraints—teeter on collapse, threatening preventable deaths from malnutrition and disease (WHO Gaza Report, June 1, 2025). Politically, U.S. credibility in multilateral forums erodes, complicating future coalition-building on global challenges—from climate change to Indo-Pacific security. Regionally, neighboring states warn of destabilizing refugee flows into Egypt and Jordan, risking broader Middle East instability (Egyptian MFA Statement, June 3, 2025).
Long-term, the GHF episode raises fundamental questions: If states can bypass UN mechanisms with impunity, what becomes of the rules-based international order? Professor Daniel Bethlehem warns that “parallel humanitarian architectures undermine IHL’s core tenets, risking a future where multiple, competing aid streams—each aligned with a belligerent—endanger civilians” (Bethlehem, IHL Under Duress, 2025). U.S. domestic polarization on foreign aid further complicates coherent policy: failure to reconcile bipartisan views on GHF and UNRWA could impact Congressional willingness to authorize future humanitarian funding.
Ultimately, this crisis invites a vital question for policymakers and legal scholars: how can the international community ensure that humanitarian aid remains both effective and neutral in complex conflicts where state and non‐state actors vie for influence? As former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland observed: “In tomorrow’s conflicts, only those aid models that respect local legitimacy and adhere to strict neutrality will succeed. Anything less condemns civilians to needless suffering” (Egeland, ICRC Lecture, May 2025).
For Further Reading
- Gaza aid sites shut, as Israel issues ‘combat zones’ warning
- US-backed Gaza aid group halts distribution; UN to vote on ceasefire demand
- US-backed Gaza aid group to pause distribution as UN votes on Gaza ceasefire demand
- UNSC to vote on Gaza ceasefire resolution amid humanitarian crisis
- UN says all of Gaza facing famine as Israel attacks aid seekers
