Rising Tensions in Washington, D.C.: When “Globalizing the Intifada” Tests American Law and Society

INTRODUCTION

Globalizing the Intifada: On May 22, 2025, the unthinkable occurred on the streets of Washington, D.C.: a pro-Palestinian activist opened fire outside the Capital Jewish Museum, murdering two Israeli-American embassy staffers—Yaron Lischinsky and Sarah Milgrim—while chanting “Free, free Palestine.” This act of political violence, framed by some as part of a global Intifada, immediately raised urgent questions about the intersection of free-speech protections, domestic counter-terrorism, and constitutional order. What does it mean, under U.S. law, when private citizens invoke international political slogans that have historically called for armed uprising? Which doctrines govern the limits of protest and when do such protests become criminal conspiracy or terrorism?

At its core, this incident juxtaposes the robust First Amendment tradition against the societal imperative of public safety and counter-terrorism. The legal framework spans the free-speech guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the federal statutes criminalizing material support for terrorism (18 U.S.C. § 2339A–B), and domestic conspiracy laws (18 U.S.C. § 371). In parallel, the policy dimension implicates U.S. commitments under international conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which balances freedom of expression with the duty to protect life.

This article argues that the Washington incident exposes deep fault lines in American constitutional and policy regimes: between free expression and incitement, between protection of minority communities and vigilance against extremist violence, and between domestic legal norms and evolving global political movements. By examining the historical contours of related statutes, tracing precedent in Supreme Court rulings on incitement, and situating the event within parallel domestic and international episodes, we illuminate the tension between a pluralistic democracy’s tolerance for dissent and its resolve to deter terrorism. As Professor Mary McCord of the Georgetown University Law Center observes, “When political slogans migrate from global contexts into U.S. streets—and then escalate to violence—the law must recalibrate the boundary between protected advocacy and punishable conspiracy.”

LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

First Amendment Protections and the Incitement Doctrine

The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech but is not absolute. In Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444 (1969)), the Supreme Court held that speech advocating illegal action is protected unless it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Under this two-pronged test, slogans like “globalize the Intifada” could be protected political hyperbole unless accompanied by imminent calls to violence in context.

Material Support and Terrorism Statutes

Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B in the post-9/11 era to criminalize material support for designated terrorist organizations. While these provisions primarily target financial or logistical aid (“knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization”), courts have grappled with protecting charitable speech versus suppressing terrorism. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (561 U.S. 1 (2010)), the Court upheld a broad interpretation of “material support,” but Justice Breyer cautioned in dissent about chilling legitimate speech.

Domestic Conspiracy and Weapons Charges

Beyond terrorism labels, 18 U.S.C. § 371 criminalizes conspiracy against the United States or to defraud it. When speech crosses into planning or coordinating violent acts, conspiracy charges attach. Federal weapons statutes (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) further penalize use of firearms in violent crime. This layered statutory scheme reflects congressional intent to deter violence while preserving political discourse.

Historical Use of Sedition and Anti-Riot Laws

In times of internal unrest, the government has invoked statutes like the Sedition Act of 1918 or the Anti-Rioting Act of 1968. Though the Sedition Act’s wartime prohibitions have long been repealed, the pattern illustrates the perennial struggle to accommodate dissent without permitting violence. As constitutional historian Jack Rakove notes, “From the Alien and Sedition Acts to today’s anti-terror laws, the U.S. has repeatedly wrestled with the balance between security and speech.”

CASE STATUS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Following the Washington shooting, federal authorities charged the alleged gunman—identified as a U.S. citizen with ties to pro-Palestinian campus groups—with:

1. Murder Charges: Two counts of first-degree murder under D.C. Code § 22-2101.
   
2. Federal Hate Crime: Under 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2), for targeting victims based on religion.
   
3. Federal Terrorism Counts: Material support and conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 2339B; § 371).
   
4. Firearms Offenses: Use of a firearm during a violent crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
   

A detention hearing in U.S. District Court for D.C. is scheduled for early June 2025. The prosecution has filed a motion citing evidence of prior online statements—videos chanting “globalize the Intifada” and messages indicating premeditation—as evidence of terrorist conspiracy. The defense is expected to challenge the government’s characterization of political speech as material support, invoking Brandenburg v. Ohio and Humanitarian Law Project to argue that political slogans do not equate to conspiracy absent concrete coordination.

Amicus briefs have poured in: The Brennan Center argues for narrow incitement standards, warning against overreach that chills protest; the Heritage Foundation emphasizes the need to adapt material-support laws to domestic contexts. The American Civil Liberties Union has submitted a brief urging the court to uphold robust free-speech protections, citing potential pretextual use against minority groups.

VIEWPOINTS AND COMMENTARY

Progressive / Liberal Perspectives

Civil-rights organizations and Democratic lawmakers stress that political violence must be punished—but caution against conflating protest with terrorism. Senator Alex Padilla (D-CA) stated, “We must condemn this horrific violence in the strongest terms. But we also must protect the right to peaceful assembly and protest. We cannot let extremists warp legitimate political expression into a pretext for repression.” Scholars like Professor Nadine Strossen (NYU School of Law) emphasize that overbroad material-support interpretations risk ensnaring academic exchanges and humanitarian aid discussions. The ACLU notes that applying terrorism statutes to domestic political speech without clear links to foreign designated groups “sets a dangerous precedent that chills dissent among minority communities” (ACLU Brief, June 2025).

Progressive legal commentators draw parallels to NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (458 U.S. 886 (1982)), where boycotts with economic pressure tactics were protected despite impact on business. Underlining moral and due-process dimensions, they argue that invoking international slogans—however inflammatory—without evidence of organized violent plot lacks the imminence required by Brandenburg.

Conservative / Right-Leaning Perspectives

Conversely, Republican lawmakers and national security advocates argue that chanting “globalize the Intifada” on U.S. soil, coupled with deadly violence, should be treated as domestic terrorism. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) declared, “This was a terrorist attack imported by radical ideology. Our laws must reflect that reality and provide prosecutors the tools to shut down these movements before more Americans are killed.” The Foundation for Defense of Democracies has published reports linking online pro-Intifada networks to Hamas propaganda, urging stricter surveillance and material-support prosecutions.

Originalist scholars point to the Constitution’s grant of authority under Article I to “provide for the common Defence,” arguing that Congress’ broad power over domestic rebellions and insurrections supports robust enforcement of anti-terror laws. They draw on Ex Parte Milligan (71 U.S. 2 (1866)), where the Court recognized the government’s authority to prosecute violent conspiracies in civilian courts, underscoring that public safety must sometimes eclipse speech freedoms when clear threats arise.

COMPARABLE OR HISTORICAL CASES

1. Brady v. United States (397 U.S. 742 (1970)): Though centered on plea bargains, this case underscored that defendants must be apprised of constitutional ramifications of their speech and actions—a reminder that due process is paramount even in terrorism prosecutions.
   
2. United States v. Rahman (189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999)): Known as the “Landmarks Bombing” case, where the “blind sheikh” and associates were convicted of conspiring to commit terrorist acts in New York. The court upheld broad “material support” convictions for defendants who provided translation and training, illustrating the expansive reach of terrorism statutes.
   
3. Charlottesville 2017 Violence: Though state and local charges predominated, legal scholars have compared the limits of incitement when extremist rallies devolve into violence. Federal authorities ultimately declined terrorism charges, fueling debate over statutory thresholds.
   

Each case reveals how courts balance evidence of organized planning against political expression. In Rahman, coordination with a foreign terrorist organization was key; in instances like Charlottesville, absence of foreign links constrained federal terrorism applications. The Washington shooting sits at the nexus: a lone actor citing foreign slogans but acting solo, challenging prosecutors to prove “material support” or conspiracy beyond mere acquiescence.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FORECASTING

Domestic Counter-Terrorism Strategy

In the short term, the Department of Justice is reviewing whether to propose amendments clarifying that domestic actors invoking foreign extremist rhetoric can be charged under material-support statutes. Policy institutes such as Brookings recommend a targeted approach: refining 18 U.S.C. § 2339B to include “domestic extremist concurrence” clauses, ensuring that lone actors inspired online are prosecutable without diluting protections for lawful speech.

Civil Liberties and Minority Trust

Overuse of terrorism statutes against political protesters risks eroding trust among Arab-American and Muslim communities. The Brennan Center warns of “chilling effects” on civic engagement. Long term, oversight mechanisms—like regular Congressional reviews—may be instituted to guard against mission creep.

International Standing and Human Rights

How the U.S. prosecutes politically charged violence reflects on its global human-rights posture. The State Department’s annual human-rights report must reconcile criticism of foreign governments’ speech restrictions with U.S. domestic prosecutions. Failure to maintain a consistent standard could undermine diplomatic credibility.

Legislative Outlook

Several bills are under discussion:

• The “Domestic Terrorism Accountability Act” (H.R. 3459), aiming to define “domestic extremist propaganda.”
  
• The “Protecting Free Speech and Civil Discourse Act” (S. 2781), designed to safeguard academic and journalistic exchanges under Humanitarian Law Project principles.
  Forecasting suggests a bifurcated legislative outcome: modest expansion of counter-terrorism tools paired with stronger First Amendment carve-outs for purely expressive activities.
  

CONCLUSION

The Washington, D.C. shooting—infused with transnational political slogans—embodies a core American dilemma: how to remain an open society that tolerates dissent while resolutely defending citizens from ideologically motivated violence. On one side lies the First Amendment’s robust protection of speech; on the other, society’s exigent need to preempt and punish terrorism. As the case unfolds, courts will test whether chanting “globalize the Intifada” crosses the constitutional line into incitement or conspiracy, and whether domestic actors can be subsumed under statutes originally aimed at foreign terrorist organizations.

Ultimately, the legal community must reconcile two imperatives: preserving the marketplace of ideas and securing the public from deadly acts. “Our legal system must be nimble,” as Professor Mary McCord advises, “to address new forms of political mobilization without sacrificing our fundamental liberties.” The broader policy question remains: how can a pluralistic democracy sustain heated political debate—even when it borrows rallying cries from distant conflicts—without inviting the very violence it seeks to deter?

For Further Reading

1. HOLDING CAMPUS LEADERS ACCOUNTABLE AND CONFRONTING ANTISEMITISM
2. April 30: Columbia threatens to expel students occupying campus building
3. Child 2930: The Implausible and Wonderful Life of Tom Buergenthal
4. Globalize the Intifada: Regional Resistance, International Struggle & Palestinian Liberation on the 36th Anniversary of the Great Intifada
5. The IDF’s miserable hasbara failure