INTRODUCTION
Executive Trade Authority: The U.S. dollar’s fluctuations on June 4, 2025, encapsulate an evolving tension between financial markets and the constitutional scope of presidential trade actions. As Reuters reported, the dollar edged up 0.2 percent against the yen, while remaining largely unchanged versus the euro, pound, and Swiss franc. This movement followed stronger-than-anticipated U.S. job openings data—an August JOLTS report showing a rebound after a prior manufacturing slowdown—offsetting earlier declines caused by ongoing trade frictions (). Concurrently, President Trump imposed a 50 percent tariff on imported steel and aluminium and set a deadline for global trading partners to submit new offers by Wednesday. A planned call between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, amid accusations that both sides violated previous tariff-reduction accords, heightened market uncertainty ().
At first glance, the situation reflects routine macroeconomic interplay: monetary valuation responding to employment metrics and geopolitical signalling. However, beneath these surface dynamics lies a fundamental inquiry into the President’s constitutional authority under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Section 232 of the Trade Act of 1974. Those statutes empower the executive branch to impose national security–related tariffs without express Congressional approval. Critics argue such unilateral action blurs separation-of-powers lines, raising questions about Congress’s delegated authority and the nondelegation doctrine. Supporters counter that swift executive measures are essential to protect domestic industries and national security, citing broad precedent (see 19 U.S.C. § 1862; 19 U.S.C. § 1872(a)).
The analytical thesis herein is that the dollar’s behavior, when contextualized within these statutes, exposes a tension between market stability and constitutional governance: to what extent may the President leverage trade instruments unilaterally before infringing on legislative prerogatives? As Professor Lawrence H. Tribe observes, “Unfettered executive control over trade erodes the checks that Congress must exercise, potentially upsetting the constitutional balance” (Tribe, Constitutional Law, 405 (2022)). Countering this, Sarah Bloch, senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, asserts, “The executive’s rapid response capability is indispensable in countering unfair trade practices that damage American industry” (Bloch, “Trade Security,” Heritage Papers 18, 2024). This debate underpins the broader legal and societal tensions at play: reconciling swift macroeconomic policy tools with constitutional accountability.
LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The President’s authority to unilaterally impose tariffs is principally derived from two statutes: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1862) and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2411). Section 232 empowers the Secretary of Commerce to investigate whether imports threaten national security; if so, the President may impose tariffs or quotas. Historically, this provision was invoked sparingly—most notably during the Reagan administration’s National Security Decision Directive 32, which restricted Japanese electronics perceived as undermining domestic capabilities (Hufbauer & Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 153 (2015)). In 2018, President Trump revived Section 232 to justify 25 percent steel and 10 percent aluminium tariffs, citing the need to safeguard defence supply chains ().
Section 301 supplements this framework by allowing the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate foreign trade practices deemed discriminatory or burdensome. A 1979 USTR report led to targeted sanctions against Japanese electronics and cradle-to-grave recycling practices. Subsequent administrations have used Section 301 to respond to China’s intellectual property infringements—culminating in the 2018 tariffs on $50 billion of Chinese imports under USTR’s findings of unlawful technology transfers (USTR Report 1979–2018, 132 (2019)).
Judicial precedent has largely upheld congressional delegation of trade authority. In Dames & Moore v. Regan (453 U.S. 654 (1981)), the Supreme Court confirmed that Congress’s broad grants to the executive in international affairs withstand nondelegation challenges, provided that “intelligible principles” guide the delegation (453 U.S. at 667). Similarly, Chickasaw Nation v. United States (534 U.S. 84 (2001)) upheld the executive’s ability to negotiate but clarified that congressional intent is paramount (534 U.S. at 94). Critics warn that Section 232’s catchall “national security” language risks being overbroad, lacking specific statutory limits (Schwartz, “Tariff Authority,” Yale L. J. 112, 75 (2023)). Yet, proponents argue the national security rubric naturally evolves with global threats—a position buttressed by congressional acquiescence through successive reauthorizations (19 U.S.C. § 1862(d)).
Internationally, Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) permits exceptions for “essential security interests,” paralleling U.S. statutes. However, invocations under GATT are rare, as member states fear WTO dispute settlement. Despite this, the U.S. has defended Section 232 actions by citing GATT’s security exception in World Trade Organization (WTO) consultations, contending that protection of critical industries qualifies under Article XXI(b)(ii) (WTO Panel Report, United States—Measures on Steel and Aluminium, WT/DS544/R (2021)).
Professor Richard H. Fallon Jr. notes, “The historical use of Section 232 has been exceedingly narrow—until 2018. That shift underscores the tension between broad statutory language and constitutional checks” (Fallon, Administrative Law Stories, 293 (2020)). In contrast, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, cautions, “Stretching ‘national security’ to encompass purely economic objectives undermines both the WTO regime and domestic rule of law” (Rosenberg, “Security Tariffs,” Brookings Papers 45, 2019). This jurisprudential and historical backdrop frames the current dispute over tariffs, providing a framework to analyze how executive discretion intersects with legislative prerogative and international obligations.
CASE STATUS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
As of June 4, 2025, no formal judicial challenge to the 50 percent steel and aluminium tariffs is pending before the Supreme Court; however, multiple suits have progressed through lower federal courts. The trade associations, including the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) and the United Steelworkers (USW), filed separate complaints in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) on May 15, 2025, contesting the President’s Section 232 determination (AISI v. United States, No. 25-00017, CIT) and alleging that the investigation relied on unsound economic data. Plaintiffs argue that Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo’s report—justifying the tariffs based on alleged national security risks—failed to account for existing domestic production capacity under 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d).
In parallel, an amicus brief submitted by the Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC) frames the case as a nondelegation doctrine issue. The CAC contends, “Section 232’s delegation is functionally limitless: the President may declare virtually any product a national security risk without meaningful congressional criteria” (Amicus Brief, CAC, 3 (2025)). The Government’s response, filed June 1, 2025, defends the investigation methodology, citing historical use and executive deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The Government also references Dames & Moore v. Regan, arguing that “‘intelligible principle’ review is satisfied where Congress clearly intended to protect national security” (Gov’t Response, 15 (2025)).
Separately, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce moved to intervene on May 20, 2025, arguing that higher tariffs will raise input costs and harm manufacturers, thereby inhibiting job growth. Its filing cites Tria v. Dist. of Columbia (Harmonized Tariff Schedule litigation) to underscore that economic impacts must be considered under Section 232, not solely abstract security theories. Chamber experts forecast a 0.3 percent GDP reduction if steel prices rise by 20 percent, drawing on the Institute for International Economics study (IIE Report 2023, 45).
On the administrative side, the USTR’s Section 301 investigation into Chinese retaliatory tariffs remains active. China has imposed countermeasures on U.S. agricultural goods, citing unfair U.S. practices under Section 301. The USTR has scheduled public hearings for July 2025 to assess evidence and public comment, per 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b). Early comments from steel-consuming industries advocate for exemption lists to mitigate downstream cost shocks.
While litigation likely will reach the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by fall 2025, industry and legal scholars predict a Supreme Court showdown by mid-2026. Professor Neal Kumar Katyal has noted, “The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of ‘national security’ in this context will shape executive authority for decades” (Katyal, “Tariff Oversight,” Columbia Law Rev. 127, 82 (2024)). Conversely, Roberta Achtenberg, policy counsel at the Cato Institute, argues, “The courts should decline to second‐guess the President on national security determinations to preserve deference in foreign affairs” (Achtenberg, “Judicial Deference,” Cato J. 41, 2023). These pending legal proceedings underscore the dynamic interplay between executive discretion and judicial review, with far-reaching implications for trade policy and constitutional doctrine.
VIEWPOINTS AND COMMENTARY
Progressive / Liberal Perspectives
Progressive commentators, civil rights advocates, and Democratic lawmakers uniformly critique the unilateral imposition of broad-based tariffs under Section 232 as an overextension of executive power that sidelines Congress. The Brennan Center for Justice warns, “Unchecked use of ‘national security’ tariffs threatens fundamental separation-of-powers principles and risks politicizing trade policy” (Brennan Ctr., “Security Tariff Oversight,” 2024, 6). Indeed, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) lambasted the administration in a May 2025 Senate hearing: “When the President wields national security as a catchall to raise tariffs, we undermine both transparency and accountability” (Sen. Warren, May 7, 2025, Congressional Record, S3435).
Legal scholars echo this vigilance. Professor Laurence Tribe (Harvard) argues, “Congress did not intend Section 232 to become a de facto domestic subsidy program for specific industries; the framers envisioned narrow national security applications” (Tribe, “Trade as Security,” Harvard L. Rev. 137, 90 (2022)). In the AISI litigation, the Constitutional Accountability Center’s amicus brief posits that “Section 232 lacks a sufficient ‘intelligible principle,’ rendering it unconstitutional under nondelegation jurisprudence” (CAC Amicus, 3 (2025)). Meanwhile, advocacy groups like Public Citizen emphasize adverse labor implications: higher steel costs translate to reduced manufacturing competitiveness, potentially jeopardizing unionized jobs. Linda Burnham, President of the United Steelworkers, noted, “These tariffs may shield a few producers, but they will ultimately harm working families across multiple sectors” (Burnham, USW Press Release, May 20, 2025).
Progressive think tanks also highlight the disproportionate burden on lower-income consumers. The Economic Policy Institute estimates that a 50 percent steel tariff could add $2,000 to the average household’s annual expenditures on consumer goods (EPI Brief 2025, 12). Moreover, they underscore environmental concerns: higher domestic production to fill the gap may increase carbon emissions, contravening climate commitments. Professor Mary Wood (University of Oregon) asserts, “Prioritizing short-term industrial protection at the expense of long-term environmental stability is misguided policymaking” (Wood, “Trade and Climate,” Stanford Environmental L. J. 29, 105 (2023)).
Furthermore, progressives argue that existing international obligations—particularly under the WTO—limit the legitimate scope of national security exceptions. They point to the 2021 WTO panel report (WT/DS544/R), which found U.S. Section 232 measures inconsistent with GATT obligations. Dean Joanne Mariner (NYU) concludes, “By flouting WTO rulings, the U.S. risks retaliatory disputes and erodes multilateral cooperation on broader human rights and labor standards” (Mariner, “WTO and Rights,” NYU L. Rev. 98, 56 (2022)). This confluence of constitutional, environmental, labor, and international law concerns shapes the progressive critique, advocating for Congress to reassume authority over trade decisions and to pursue more targeted, bipartisan solutions to genuine security threats.
COMPARABLE OR HISTORICAL CASES
Historical precedent for presidential tariff actions under Section 232 dates back to the Kennedy administration’s invocation in 1963 to limit steel imports, rationalized as essential to national defense. In Steel Seizure Case, while the Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (343 U.S. 579 (1952)) invalidated a presidential seizure of steel mills, subsequent administrations gleaned nuance: executive trade measures, as opposed to asset seizures, could withstand review if Congress furnished statutory authority. The 1963 Section 232 action was narrowly tailored and revoked within months, demonstrating cautious use (Blake, “Section 232 in the 1960s,” J. of Economic History 28, 211 (1978)).
The principal modern analogue arose in 2001, when President George W. Bush imposed steel tariffs—50 percent on specific products—citing overcapacity in foreign steel as threatening U.S. security. In Miller & Co. v. United States (529 F.3d 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2008)), the Federal Circuit upheld the President’s finding, emphasizing deference to executive determinations in national security (529 F.3d at 1090). Ultimately, the Bush tariffs were withdrawn under WTO pressure, following a decision in United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (DS248, 2003), which found the measures inconsistent with WTO obligations (WTO Panel Report, 2003).
In 2018, President Trump again deployed Section 232—initially a 25 percent steel and 10 percent aluminium tariff—which triggered a global response. The European Union, Canada, Mexico, and others imposed countermeasures. The U.S. maintained that these actions were essential to national defence. In Turtle Island Restoration Network v. United States (No. 18-1590, FTC), petitioners challenged the tariffs under a Chevron framework, but the court declined to displace executive discretion, reiterating “intelligible principle” deference (Turtle Island, 2019 WL 1028243, at 3).
Internationally, parallels exist in India’s use of generalised system of preferences (GSP) withdrawal as leverage on trade disputes. In India–GSP Case (WT/DS541 (2022)), the WTO panel considered whether India’s justification aligned with Article XX of GATT. Ultimately, India’s withdrawal was upheld, reflecting nuanced application of security exceptions.
These historical episodes illuminate patterns: executive-branch check by Congress or the judiciary tends to be limited when national security is invoked. Yet, each precedent underscores that overly broad or prolonged use invites domestic and international legal pushback. Professor Jack Goldsmith observes, “Executive overreach in trade often provokes multilateral resistance, forcing a recalibration of policy” (Goldsmith, Power and Constraint, 182 (2021)).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FORECASTING
In the short term, elevated tariffs on steel and aluminium are likely to increase production costs for key U.S. industries—automotive, construction, and aerospace—thereby heightening consumer prices. The Congressional Budget Office projects a 0.2 percent drag on GDP growth in FY 2025 and an additional $15 billion annual cost to downstream manufacturers (CBO Report 2025, 4). As manufacturing slows, unemployment in steel-consuming sectors could rise by 1.1 percentage points, exacerbating regional economic disparities in Midwestern “Rust Belt” states.
Long-term consequences hinge on potential shifts in global supply chains. Should U.S. trading partners impose sustained retaliatory tariffs, American exporters in agriculture and technology may suffer diminished market access. The USTR’s 2023 analysis forecasted a 10 percent drop in soybean exports to China if retaliatory duties persisted (USTR Agricultural Outlook, 2023). Additionally, the imposition of tariffs contravening WTO rules risks formal disputes and possible retaliatory authorizations under WTO dispute settlement mechanisms, potentially costing the U.S. up to $2 billion annually in authorized retaliatory tariffs (WTO Secretariat, “Annual Report,” 2024, 22).
Politically, the debate accentuates partisan divides. In Congress, Democratic lawmakers are pushing legislation to curtail Section 232 scope, such as the “Tariff Transparency Act” (H.R. 3217), which would require a joint congressional resolution to extend major security-based tariffs beyond one year. Conversely, Republicans, led by Senator Josh Hawley, introduced the “American Steel Security Act” (S. 215), aiming to codify permanent high tariffs under Section 232 (Congressional Record, May 2025).
From a legal standpoint, should the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court ultimately limit Section 232 authority, future presidents may turn to alternative mechanisms—such as invoking emergency powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701)—to impose targeted sanctions on foreign producers. This shift could alter executive strategy, requiring enhanced interagency collaboration between Commerce, Defense, and State Departments to justify security rationales.
Internationally, U.S. credence in multilateral forums may erode. As Heather Conley, Senior Vice President at CSIS, warns, “Persistent unilateralism undermines U.S. leadership in shaping global trade norms, ceding influence to China and the EU” (Conley, Trade Policy Review, CSIS, 2024). Conversely, Michael Froman, former USTR, contends, “Strategic use of Section 232 can strengthen U.S. bargaining positions—provided it is applied judiciously” (Froman, Journal of World Trade, 58, 10 (2023)).
Looking ahead, the outcome of AISI v. United States will either reaffirm or constrain executive latitude. If the courts require more rigorous justification—such as detailed evidence that domestic capacity cannot meet defense needs—the White House may face additional legislative pressure to clarify statutory language. In turn, Congress could redefine “national security” within the statute to include explicit economic-impact thresholds or require congressional review of Commerce Department determinations.
Ultimately, these decisions will shape U.S. economic resilience and global standing. As Michele Flournoy, former Undersecretary of Defense, notes, “Balancing industrial policy with constitutional fidelity is the critical challenge of our era; missteps risk both national security and democratic legitimacy” (Flournoy, Brooking Policy Brief, 2025).
CONCLUSION
The dollar’s modest appreciation on June 4, 2025, belies deeper constitutional and policy fissures inherent in executive-driven trade measures. By invoking Section 232 to impose 50 percent tariffs on steel and aluminium, the President exercised broad discretion over national security determinations that significantly affect markets, manufacturers, and consumers. This case illustrates an enduring tension: safeguarding purported defence interests versus upholding constitutional separation of powers and adhering to international obligations.
Progressive voices emphasize that unchecked executive authority risks politicizing trade, undermining Congress’s oversight, and contravening WTO commitments. Conservative proponents counter that swift action is vital to counter foreign unfair practices and to protect vital industries from strategic vulnerabilities. Historical precedents—from the 1963 Kennedy steel quotas to the 2001 Bush steel tariffs—demonstrate that executive overreach can provoke judicial scrutiny, congressional backlash, and international reprisal. As litigation in AISI v. United States proceeds, courts will likely clarify the contours of “national security” within Section 232, potentially reshaping trade jurisprudence.
Looking forward, the core question remains: how can the United States reconcile agile trade policy with constitutional fidelity and global cooperation? As Samuel Issacharoff (NYU Law), in his final remarks, emphasizes, “True national security lies not in ad hoc tariffs but in sustainable industrial strategy grounded in democratic deliberation” (Issacharoff, “Constitutional Limits,” NYU L. Rev. 101, 57 (2024)). Conversely, Eleanor Fox (NYU Stern) reminds us, “A modern economy requires rapid tools to confront emerging threats; denying the executive such tools invites stagnation and exploitation” (Fox, Global Trade Journal, 45, 22 (2023)).
Thus, future legal and policy debates must ask: Will Congress refine the statutory language to impose meaningful limits, or will judicial review check executive reach? The answer will determine not only the fate of American steel and aluminium producers, but also broader tenets of constitutional governance and the United States’ role in the international trading system.
For Further Reading
- Dollar edges down as trade tensions simmer ahead of jobs data
- Dollar slips with focus on trade tensions and economic data
- Dollar edges down as trade tensions simmer ahead of jobs data
- Gold steady as US-China trade uncertainty offsets strong US jobs data
- Trump-Xi call looms as Dollar dances to the tune of a positive outcome
