Introduction
In a move that signals a significant shift in American trade diplomacy, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer confirmed on April 30, 2025, that a series of limited trade agreements could be finalized within weeks—deals spanning nations like the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, and others. Yet conspicuously missing from these negotiations is China, the United States’ largest bilateral trading partner for most of the last two decades. Greer acknowledged that no formal trade discussions are currently underway with Beijing.
This moment—marked by strategic engagement with smaller economies and conspicuous disengagement from the world’s second-largest economy—raises deep constitutional, legal, and geopolitical questions. The U.S. government’s authority to execute trade agreements rests in a constitutional matrix between executive prerogative and legislative oversight. Trade acts, congressional mandates, and multilateral treaties like those under the World Trade Organization (WTO) add further layers to the legality and legitimacy of such deals.
The societal implications are also far-reaching. Without formal trade talks with China, what message does the U.S. send about its commitment to a global rules-based order? Can bilateral agreements serve as a viable substitute for large-scale multilateralism? What are the implications for American labor, consumers, and foreign policy?
“Trade policy is not merely a function of economics—it reflects national identity, values, and political will.” — Dr. Emily Chen, Professor of International Trade Law, Georgetown University
This article critically examines these tensions through a constitutional lens, offers a detailed legal history of trade authority in the U.S., evaluates the current landscape of negotiations, and balances progressive and conservative interpretations of the administration’s strategy. It further assesses historical parallels, international precedents, and offers forecasts for American legal and policy environments in a post-globalized trade regime.
Legal and Historical Background
Constitutional Authority over Trade
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution—commonly known as the Commerce Clause—gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations.” This authority forms the legislative backbone of all U.S. trade policy.
However, over the last century, Congress has delegated substantial trade negotiating authority to the President, beginning with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and evolving through the Trade Act of 1974, which created mechanisms like “Fast Track” and later the “Trade Promotion Authority” (TPA). Under TPA (19 U.S.C. § 2902), Congress agrees to a streamlined process for considering trade agreements, allowing only an up-or-down vote without amendments. This delegation aims to empower the executive branch to negotiate effectively while preserving legislative oversight.
Key Statutory Instruments
Several statutes are particularly relevant to understanding modern trade maneuvering:
- Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq.): Allows the President to impose tariffs for national security, human rights violations, or to enforce trade agreement compliance.
- Section 301 of the Trade Act: Empowers the USTR to investigate and respond to unfair trade practices.
- Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1862): Authorizes the President to restrict imports deemed harmful to national security.
- International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA): Grants the executive sweeping authority to regulate commerce in response to national emergencies.
These provisions collectively form the arsenal of tools that modern presidents have used not only to pursue bilateral trade deals but also to unilaterally impose tariffs and restrictions.
“The erosion of congressional primacy in trade has mirrored the broader trend toward an imperial presidency.” — Dr. Alan Reynolds, Legal Historian, University of Michigan Law School
WTO and Multilateralism
The 1994 establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) marked a peak in multilateral global trade governance. The U.S. was a founding member and a key architect. Yet, the last two decades have seen increasing American ambivalence toward the institution, culminating in the Trump administration’s blockage of WTO appellate judges and the Biden administration’s tepid support for reform. The current administration appears to continue this trend of circumventing the WTO in favor of bilateral agreements.
Case Status and Legal Proceedings
While no specific litigation is underway concerning the agreements USTR Greer referenced, the legal process of enacting trade deals remains closely watched. Each agreement must eventually pass muster through congressional approval or face challenges in administrative courts if implemented through executive action.
Greer’s April 30 comments confirmed talks with multiple countries, including the UK, Japan, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Guyana. Some of these may be limited to specific sectors such as digital trade, food safety, or defense-related components.
“Not all agreements require congressional ratification; some can be concluded as ‘executive agreements,’ particularly when falling within the President’s delegated authority.” — Dr. Melissa Trask, Former USTR Legal Counsel
However, executive agreements can face legal vulnerability if they alter existing statutes or contradict legislative intent. Additionally, labor unions, environmental organizations, or even foreign states could potentially seek judicial relief if such deals violate international or domestic legal standards.
Legal scholars also debate whether the non-engagement with China constitutes a breach of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligations under the WTO, given that the U.S. still imposes Section 301 tariffs on Chinese goods while easing terms with other countries.
Viewpoints and Commentary
Progressive / Liberal Perspectives
Progressive analysts and left-leaning policy institutions argue that the administration’s selective bilateralism risks exacerbating global inequality and undermining the legitimacy of international institutions.
“The U.S. cannot claim to uphold a liberal world order while evading its commitments under multilateral systems like the WTO.” — Senator Elizabeth Markey (D-MA)
Many Democrats emphasize the necessity for trade agreements to include enforceable labor rights, environmental standards, and anti-corruption measures. Groups like the AFL-CIO and Public Citizen warn against “corporate giveaways” that fail to protect workers or the environment.
“Trade justice requires more than market access. It demands accountability, sustainability, and human dignity.” — Sarah Garvey, Executive Director, Citizens for Trade Justice
Progressive law scholars further criticize the exclusion of China from talks as a missed opportunity to build constructive diplomatic channels on pressing issues such as supply chain resilience, forced labor, and climate cooperation.
Conservative / Right-Leaning Perspectives
Conversely, conservative legal thinkers, national security analysts, and Republican lawmakers praise the administration’s emphasis on national sovereignty and bilateralism.
“One-size-fits-all trade agreements rarely work. Bilateral deals allow us to negotiate from strength and protect American interests.” — Senator Tom Blackburn (R-OK)
For many on the right, trade policy is fundamentally a national security tool. China’s economic rise, intellectual property theft, and subsidies for state-owned enterprises are viewed as existential threats to Western industry.
“The notion that trade is an apolitical good is outdated. In a multipolar world, trade is leverage.” — Dr. Kent Wallace, Senior Fellow, Heritage Foundation
They also argue that U.S. workers have long suffered under multilateralism that favored global capital mobility over domestic industrial base retention. The new wave of bilateralism is seen as a correction to decades of offshoring and deregulation.
Comparable or Historical Cases
Reagan-Era Japan Trade Battles (1980s)
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration pursued aggressive bilateral negotiations with Japan, citing unfair trade practices in automobiles and semiconductors. These resulted in voluntary export restraints and direct U.S.-Japan arrangements outside GATT frameworks.
“The Japan model showed that assertive bilateralism can compel reform—but at the cost of trade consistency and institutional faith.” — Prof. Linda Feldstein, Stanford School of Law
2001 U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement
The landmark U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement, signed prior to Vietnam’s WTO accession, paved the way for normalization and market integration. Like the current moves with the Philippines and Saudi Arabia, it served both economic and diplomatic functions.
2018–2020 U.S.-China Phase One Deal
Perhaps the most direct antecedent is the 2020 “Phase One” deal between Washington and Beijing. Though it addressed issues like intellectual property and currency manipulation, most experts agree it failed to resolve structural tensions.
“Phase One was a temporary bandage on a long-term wound. The disengagement in 2025 reflects the limits of that framework.” — Dr. Henrietta Jones, Asia-Pacific Legal Studies, Columbia University
Policy Implications and Forecasting
The current trajectory has both immediate and enduring consequences for trade policy, governance, and global trust.
Short-Term Implications
- Sectoral Gains: Certain industries—digital tech, pharmaceuticals, energy—may benefit from streamlined bilateral pacts.
- Legal Uncertainty: Executive agreements made without congressional ratification may face judicial scrutiny.
- Diplomatic Strain: Allies excluded from preferred deals may seek closer alignment with China or other blocs.
Long-Term Consequences
- Rule of Law Erosion: Disuse of WTO procedures and MFN standards undermines the rules-based global order.
- Labor and Climate Gaps: Weak side-agreements may prompt litigation and civil unrest if labor/environmental promises are broken.
- China Decoupling Risks: Economic “decoupling” may accelerate without a diplomatic off-ramp, risking supply shocks and geopolitical friction.
“The new doctrine seems to prioritize resilience over efficiency, sovereignty over scale. The question is whether that approach can be sustained without institutional erosion.” — Dr. Martin Keegan, Brookings Institution
Conclusion
The U.S. trade posture in 2025 is marked by a paradox: aggressive bilateralism with strategic allies on one hand, and conspicuous silence toward China on the other. This reflects deeper structural shifts—legal, constitutional, ideological—shaping the future of American economic diplomacy.
Progressives decry the abandonment of multilateralism and labor standards. Conservatives herald a reassertion of sovereignty and strategic clarity. Both agree, however, that the trade architecture of the 1990s is obsolete.
“Law and power are not antithetical in trade—they must coexist. The challenge is designing mechanisms that are lawful, credible, and geopolitically adaptive.” — Dr. Noor al-Hakim, NYU School of Law
Looking ahead, the unanswered question is whether the U.S. can forge a durable 21st-century trade regime that reconciles economic nationalism with global leadership.
What role should law play in restoring legitimacy to American trade policy in an era of power politics and economic fragmentation?
For Further Reading
- Brookings Institution – “Restructuring U.S. Trade Diplomacy in a Fragmented World”
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/restructuring-us-trade-diplomacy-in-a-fragmented-world/ - Cato Institute – “Executive Overreach in Trade Policy: A Legal Critique”
https://www.cato.org/publications/executive-overreach-trade-policy - Heritage Foundation – “Why Bilateralism Works Better in the New Trade Era”
https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/why-bilateralism-works-better-new-trade-era - Center for American Progress – “Restoring Accountability in Trade Agreements”
https://www.americanprogress.org/article/restoring-accountability-trade-agreements/ - Council on Foreign Relations – “The Future of U.S.-China Economic Relations”
https://www.cfr.org/report/future-us-china-economic-relations